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The After-Acquired Evidence Doctrine:




When a fired employee charges his former employer with discrimina-
tory termination, the employer may have a partial or complete defense,
even if the employer violated civil rights law. Such a defense arises if,
during the litigation, the employer discovers evidence of employee mis-
conduct that would have provided legal grounds for firing the employ-
ee. Based on this "after-acquired evidence," courts often grant summary
judgment in favor of the employer, avoiding a trial on the discrimina-
tion claim.'
The after-acquired evidence doctrine applies principally in two factual
contexts: First, in refusal to hire cases,2 and second, in wrongful dis-
charge cases, where such evidence either shows serious employee mis-
conduct on the job,3 or employee misrepresentation of qualifications4
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1. See infra note 9 and accompanying text.
2. See, e.g., Smallwood v. United Air Lines, Inc., 728 F.2d 614 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 832 (1984) (commercial pilot); Puhy v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 833 F.
Supp. 1577 (N.D. Ga. 1993) (commercial pilot and flight engineer); Kravit v. Delta Air
Lines, Inc., 60 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 994 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (airline customer
services agent); Punahele v. United Air Lines, Inc., 756 F. Supp. 487 (D. Colo. 1991)
(ramp service employee).
3. E.g., McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 9 F.3d 539 (6th Cir. 1993)
cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 2099 (1994) (removal of confidential company files); Sum-
mers v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1988) (falsification of
company records); Malone v. Signal Processing Technologies, Inc., 826 F. Supp. 370
(D. Colo. 1993) (sexual misconduct and removal of confidential company files); Smith
on a job application.' Nearly all courts and administrative agencies that
have confronted this issue6 have acknowledged the relevance of after-
v. Equitable Life Assurance Co., 60 Empl. Prac. Dec. 42,001 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (falsifi-
cation of insurance application); O'Day v. McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Co., 784 F.
Supp. 1466 (D. Ariz. 1992) (removal of confidential company files); Bonger v. Ameri-
can Water Works, 789 F. Supp. 1102 (D. Colo. 1992) (removal of confidential compa-
ny files); Lohmann v. Towers, Perrin, Forster, & Crosby, Inc., 8 Indiv. Empl. Rts. Cas.
(BNA) 696 (S.D. Tex. 1992) (improperly obtaining and disclosing electronic mail mes-
sages); Printon v. Sterling Nat'l Bank, No. 87 Civ. 4640 (JMC), 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
912 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 1990) (violation of banking laws); Proulx v. Citibank, N.A., 681
F. Supp. 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (habitual lateness).
4. This practice is known as "resume fraud."
5. E.g., Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221 (3d Cir. 1994), petition
for cert. filed, 63 U.S.L.W. 3371 (U.S. Oct. 24, 1994) (No. 94-742) (misrepresentation
of having college education and employment experience); Welch v. Liberty Mach.
Works, Inc., 23 F.3d 1403 (8th Cir. 1994) (concealment of prior discharge); O'Driscoll
v. Hercules, Inc., 12 F.3d 176 (10th Cir. 1994) (misrepresentation of age); Kristufek v.
Hussmann Foodservice Co., 985 F.2d 364 (7th Cir. 1993) (misrepresentation of educa-
tional qualifications); Dotson v. U.S. Postal Serv., 977 F.2d 976 (6th Cir. 1992) (con-
cealment of medical condition and prior employment discharges for cause); Milligan-
Jensen v. Michigan Tech. Univ., 975 F.2d 302 (6th Cir. 1992) (concealment of drunken
driving conviction), cert. granted, 113 S.Ct. 2991 (1993); Johnson v. Honeywell Info.
Systems, Inc., 955 F.2d 409 (6th Cir. 1992) (misrepresentation of education);
Washington v. Lake County, Ill., 969 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1992) (concealed convictions
for criminal trespass and third degree assault); Smallwood, 728 F.2d 614 (concealment
of misconduct at former job); Massey v. Trump's Castle Hotel & Casino, 828 F. Supp.
314 (D.N.J. 1993) (misrepresentation of prior job dismissal for sexual harassment);
Moodie v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 831 F. Supp. 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (con-
cealment of prior discharge); Russell v. Microdyne Corp., 830 F. Supp. 305 (E.D. Va.
1993) (concealment of lay off from prior job); Bonger v. American Water Works, 789
F. Supp. 1102 (D. Colo. 1992) (misrepresentation of college education); DeVoe v.
Medi-Dyn, Inc., 782 F. Supp. 546 (D. Kan. 1992) (concealment of credit problems and
domestic problems); Redd v. Fisher Controls, 814 F. Supp. 547 (W.D. Tex. 1992) (con-
cealment of third degree theft conviction); Punahele v. United Air Lines, Inc., 756 F.
Supp. 487 (D. Colo. 1991) (concealment of tardiness record of former employer);
Churchman v. Pinkerton's, Inc., 756 F. Supp. 515 (D. Kan. 1991) (concealment of
prior drug use and two instances of discharge for cause); Benson v. Quanex Corp.,
58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 743 (E.D. Mich. 1992) (concealment of robbery con-
viction and aspects of employment history); Mathis v. Boeing Military Airplane Co.,
719 F. Supp. 991 (D. Kan. 1989) (concealment of felony conviction and aspects of
employment history); Livingston v. Sorg Printing Co., 49 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
1417 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (misrepresentation of prior employment history and experience);
Jordan v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 9 Indiv. Empl. Rts. Cas. (BNA) 302 (Tex. Ct. App.
1994) (concealment of armed robbery conviction).
6. In workers' compensation cases many courts require that, to bar recovery, af-
ter-acquired evidence of employee misconduct must bear a causal connection to the
injury, such as where an employee, on his job application, misrepresents his medical
condition and later seeks Workers' Compensation for an injury precipitated by that
condition. See, e.g., Rowland v. Carriers Ins. Co., 738 S.W.2d 183 (Tenn. 1987). For a
discussion of the doctrine's application to Worker's Compensation cases, see generally
Mitchell H. Rubinstein, The Use of Predischarge Misconduct Discovered After an
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acquired evidence of employee misconduct to discrimination claims.7
However, courts have mainly followed two approaches in determining
what effect the after-acquired evidence should have on a discrimination
case.
8
Most courts grant summary judgment and deny the employee any
remedy' if the employer can prove, sometimes by patently self-serving
Employee's Termination as a Defense in Employment Litigation, 24 SUFFOLK U. L
REv. 1, 21-23 (1990).
7. One court has interpreted Summers broadly, holding that evidence of employee
misconduct arising after notice of termination may mitigate the damages available to
the employee alleging wrongful discharge. Boynton v. Vallas, No. 92C140, 1994 WL
163849, at *1 (N.D. III. Apr. 29, 1994). However, several cases have rejected using af-
ter-acquired evidence as a complete or partial defense. E.g., Doe v. Marshalls, Inc.,
No. Civ. 393267, 1994 WL 66061, at *3 (D. Minn. Jan. 10, 1994) (specifically rejecting
the use of after-acquired evidence as proposed in both Summers and Wallace);
Lohmann v. Towers, Perrin, Forster & Crosby, Inc., 8 Indiv. Empl. Rts. Cas. (BNA)
696, 697 (S.D. Tex. 1992) (categorically rejecting after-acquired evidence doctrine in
any form); McPartland v. American Broadcasting Co., Inc., 623 F. Supp. 1334, 1344
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (entertaining possibility of awarding discharged employee reinstate-
ment despite after-acquired evidence of material resume fraud).
8. See infra notes 9-14, 18-20 and accompanying text
9. E.g., O'Driscoll v. Hercules, Inc., 12 F.3d 176, 180-81 (10th Cir. 1994);
McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 9 F.3d 539, 543 (6th Cir. 1993), cert.
granted, 114 S. Ct. 2099 (1994); Johnson v. Honeywell Info. Sys., Inc., 955 F.2d 409,
415 (6th Cir. 1992); Washington v. Lake County, IlL, 969 F.2d 250, 257 (7th Cir. 1992);
Summers v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 700, 709 (10th Cir. 1988); Alex-
ander v. Unified School Dist. No. 259, No. 92-1550-PFK, 1993 WL 544279, at *1 (D.
Kan. Dec. 30, 1993); Mardell v. Harleysvllle Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221, 1238 (3d Cir.
1994) (denying availability of summary judgment for employer based on after-acquired
evidence); Russell v. Microdyne Corp., 830 F. Supp. 305, 308 (E.D. Va. 1993); Van
Deursen v. United States Tobacco Sales and Mktg. Co., 839 F. Supp. 760, 764 (D.
Colo. 1993); Bonger v. American Water Works, 789 F. Supp. 1102, 1107 (D. Colo.
1992); Kravit v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 60 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 994, 997
(E.D.N.Y. 1992); Churchman v. Pinkerton's Inc., 756 F. Supp. 515, 521 (D. Kan. 1991);
Livingston v. Sorg Printing Co., 49 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1417, 1419 (S.D.N.Y.
1989); Jordan v. Johnson Controls, Inc., No. 05-93-00132-CV, 1994 WL 65650, at *6
(Tex. Ct. App. Feb. 23, 1994). But see Kristufek v. Hussmann Food Service Co., 985
F.2d 364, 370 (7th Cir. 1993) (reinstating jury verdict, after district court granted
employer's motion for judgment NOV because no question of fact existed as to
whether after-acquired evidence of resume fraud was material); contra Turnes v.
AmSouth Bank, 36 F.3d 1057 (11th Cir. 1994) (denying motion for summary judgment
so that finder of fact could determine whether defendant would have discovered
after-acquired evidence and would not have hired plaintiff based on that evidence);
Conlin v. Mission Foods Corp., 850 F. Supp. 856, 861 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (denying mo-
tion for summary judgment because employee made no misrepresentations); Malone v.
Signal Processing Technologies, Inc., 826 F. Supp. 370, 376 (D. Colo. 1993) (denying
attestations,"0 that it would have fired the employee," would not have
hired the employee,'2 or both, 3 if it had learned of the misconduct.'4
motion for summary judgment because question of fact existed as to whether employ-
ee would have been fired if employer had known of after-acquired evidence); Moodie
v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 831 F. Supp. 333, 335 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (denying
motion for summary judgment because questions of fact existed as to whether em-
ployer would not have hired and would have fired employee if it had known of after-
acquired evidence); Smith v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 60 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1225, 1227 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding that summary judgment should never be
granted based on after-acquired evidence); DeVoe v. Medi-Dyn, Inc., 782 F. Supp. 546,
553 (D. Kan. 1992) and Punahele v. United Air Lines, Inc., 756 F. Supp. 487, 491 (D.
Colo. 1991) (denying motions for summary judgment because questions of fact existed
as to whether employer would not have hired plaintiff if it had known of after-ac-
quired evidence).
10. E.g., Hercules, 12 F.3d at 180 (relying on affidavits of managers swearing that
employee would have been fired for misrepresenting her age and related matters, de-
spite employee's showing that employer had not dismissed others for similar impro-
prieties); Bonger, 789 F. Supp. at 1107 (admitting that the declarations in the affida-
vits of employer's witnesses submitted on motion for summary judgment that employ-
ee would have been fired for falsely asserting that she had college education were
self-serving and questionable in light of employee's uniformly positive evaluations, but
nevertheless granting the motion because the statements stood unrebutted);
Pinkerton's, 756 F. Supp. at 521 (crediting conclusory affidavits that employee would
have been fired for falsely denying past use of drugs and concealing two instances of
termination); contra Welch v. Liberty Mach. Works, Inc., 23 F.3d 1403, 1406 (8th Cir.
1994) (reversing district court's grant of summary judgment because self-serving affi-
davit failed to meet "substantial burden" test).
11. See, e.g., Hercules, 12 F.3d at 179 (resume fraud); McKennon v. Nashville Ban-
ner Publishing Co., 9 F.3d 539, 541 (6th Cir. 1993) cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 2099
(1994) (job misconduct); Washington v. Lake County, Il1., 969 F.2d 250, 256 (7th Cir.
1992) (resume fraud); State Farm, 864 F.2d at 703 (job misconduct); O'Day v.
McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Co., 784 F. Supp 1466, 1468 (D. Ariz. 1992) (job mis-
conduct); Benson v. Quanex Corp., 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 743, 745 (E.D.
Mich 1992) (resume fraud).
12. See, e.g., Turnes v. AmSouth Bank, 36 F.3d 1057 (11th Cir. 1994) (reversing
summary judgment for defendant to allow finder of fact to determine whether it
would not have hired plaintiff based on after-acquired evidence); Smallwood v. United
Air Lines, Inc., 728 F. 2d 614 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 832 (1984) (reversing
judgment for plaintiff after trial because after-acquired evidence established that
defendant would not have hired him).
13. E.g., Honeywell, 955 F.2d at 415; Johnson Controls, 1994 WL 65650, at *6;
Harleysville, 1993 WL 661152, at *6.; Van Deursen v. United States Tobacco Sales and
Marketing Co., 839 F. Supp. 760, 764 (D. Colo. 1993); Moodie, 831 F. Supp. at 335;
Redd v. Fisher Controls, 814 F. Supp. 547, 551 n. 2 (W.D. Tex. 1992); Microdyne, 830
F. Supp. at 307; Pinkertons', 756 F. Supp. at 521; Mathis v. Boeing Military Airplane
Co., 719 F. Supp. 991, 994 (D. Kan. 1989).
14. In discussing the distinctions between the "would not have hired test" and the
.would have fired" test, the court in Washington v. Lake Co., Ill., 969 F.2d 250, 256
(7th Cir. 1992) observed that, although the "would not have hired" test may be ap-
propriate in refusal to hire cases, the "would have fired" test is appropriate in wrong-
ful discharge cases. The court in Massey v. Trump's Hotel & Casino, 828 F. Supp.
[Vol. 22: 365, 1995] After-Acquired Evidence
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This approach tempts employers to manufacture evidence showing that
they would have fired the employee if they had known of his miscon-
duct.15 Even more distressing, this approach excuses employer discrim-
ination based on an employee's breach of contract. It confuses the
employer's right to rescind the contract with license to commit inde-
pendent civil wrongs against the employee and violate duties to the em-
ployee which arise, not out of the employment contract, but rather
from federal law and public policy."6
A minority of courts apply the doctrine to preclude awards of front
pay and reinstatement but allow an employee to recover backpay until
the date the employer would have discovered the employee misconduct
independent of the discrimination suit.'7 Like the majority position, this
approach 8 requires the employer to show that it either would not have
314, 323 (D.N.J. 1993), concurring with the reasoning in Washington, concluded that
"[tihe inquiry in employment discrimination cases must focus on whether the employ-
er would have made the same employment decision," whether that decision was the
refusal to hire or the termination of employment. Although the Massey court's view
is reasonable, other courts have applied both tests in resume fraud discharge cases.
See, e.g., Honeywell, 955 F.2d at 415; Van Deursen, 839 F. Supp. at 763; Redd, 814 F.
Supp. at 553. Similarly, although the "would not have hired" test seems particularly
suited to refusal to hire cases, see for example, Smallwood, 728 F.2d at 626, some
courts have applied this test in wrongful discharge cases. See, e.g., DeVoe v. Medi-
Dyn, Inc., 782 F. Supp. 546, 553 (D. Kan. 1992); Punahele v. United Air Lines, Inc.,
756 F. Supp. 487, 491 (D. Colo. 1991).
15. See infra notes 196-200, 251 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 168-78 and accompanying text.
17. See, e.g., Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co., 968 F.2d 1174 (11th Cir. 1992), reh'g
granted, No. 91-7406, 1994 WL 481439 (Sept. 6, 1994). This case will be used through-
out this Article as representative of the minority approach, although the 11th Circuit
has vacated the opinion and granted a rehearing en banc. Since other jurisdictions
have adopted the Wallace position, it will likely continue to have adherents even if
the 11th Circuit repudiates it. See Massey v. Trump's Castle Hotel & Casino, 828 F.
Supp. 314, 324 (D.N.J. 1993) (expressly following Wallace). For other cases following
the minority approach, see Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221 (3d Cir.
1994), petition for cert. filed, 63 U.S.L.W. 3371 (U.S. Oct. 24, 1994)(No. 94-742); Puhy
v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 833 F. Supp. 1577 (N.D. Ga. 1993); Proulx v. Citibank, N.A.,
681 F. Supp. 199, 203, (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
18. In wrongful discharge cases, this approach provides a partial defense, since the
employee is entitled to backpay until the date the employer would have discovered
the after-acquired evidence independent of the discrimination lawsuit. Wallace, 968
F.2d at 1182; Massey, 828 F. Supp. at 324; Proux v. Citibank, N.A., 681 F. Supp. 199,
203 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). In refusal to hire cases, this approach might provide a complete
defense. If the employer would have discovered the after-acquired evidence through
its customary procedures to investigate prospective employees at the application
hired'9 or would have fired the employee if it had known of the mis-
conduct.' Although avoiding the shortcomings of the majority ap-
proach, this formulation suffers from the fault of requiring the employer
to prove the essentially unprovable-that it would have learned of the
misconduct, even if the discharged employee had not brought the dis-
crimination suit. To prevail, the employer must even prove when it
would have learned of the misconduct.2'
Some jurisdictions have cases siding with either the majority or mi-
nority position."
A third approach, which has enlisted disappointingly little support,
discontinues the aggrieved employee's right to backpay from the date
the employer actually discovers the after-acquired evidence.' This po-
sition, although inexplicably unpopular with the courts, affords the ag-
grieved employee a remedy; yet, the employer is not burdened with
having to prove vexing hypotheticals.
stage, the employer would never have offered the job to the employee. Hence the
employee, even if a victim of discrimination, is not entitled to any backpay. See, e.g.,
SmaUwood, 728 F.2d at 626; Puhy, 833 F. Supp. at 1582.
19. Turnes v. AmSouth Bank, 36 F.3d 1057 (11th Cir. 1994); SmaUwood, 728 F.2d
at 626; Puhy, 833 F. Supp. at 1582.
20. MardeU, 31 F.3d at 1240; Wallace, 968 F.2d at 1181 n.l; Massey, 828 F. Supp.
at 327; Proulx, 681 F. Supp. at 203.
21. Prou/x, 681 F. Supp. at 203.
22. Compare Kravit v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., No. CV-92-0038, 1992 WL 390236, at *3
(E.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 1992) (expressly following Summers and distinguishing Wallace in a
refusal to hire case) with Proulx, 681 F. Supp. at 203 (adopting the Wallace ap-
proach); compare Redd v. Fisher Controls, 814 F. Supp. 547, 551 (W.D. Tex. 1992)
(expressly following Summers) with Lohmann v. Towers, Perrin, Forster & Crosby,
Inc., No. Civ. A-H-91-3586, 1992 WL 548195, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 28, 1992) (categori-
cally rejecting use of after-acquired evidence as a defense to wrongful a discharge
claim).
23. Compare Kristufek v. Hussmann Foodservice Co., 985 F.2d 364,371 (7th Cir.
1993) (applying date of discovery test) [and] Smith v. General Scanning, Inc., 876
F.2d 1315, 1319 n.2 (7th Cir. 1989) (suggesting in dicta that the court might follow
this approach) with Washington v. Lake County, 969 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1992) (follow-
ing Summers approach); see also Printon v. Sterling Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., No. 87-
C4690, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 912, at *18 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 1990) (stating that the
plaintiff should not be barred from recovering damages for the period prior to
defendant's discovery of the alleged misconduct, but not clarifying whether such dis-
covery must be from a source independent of the discrimination lawsuit). The NLRB
has adopted this approach in unfair labor practice cases. See, e.g., John Cuneo, Inc.,
298 N.LR.B. 856 (1990) (observing that "we must balance our responsibility to rem-
edy the respondent's unfair labor practice against the public interest in not condoning
Brite's falsification of his employment application"); Axeson, Inc., 285 N.L.R.B. 862
(1987) (limiting backpay award to wrongfully discharged strikers to the date after-ac-
quired evidence of strike misconduct discovered); AA Superior Ambulance Serv., 292
N.L.R.B. 835 (1989) (following Axelson). For a discussion of the application of the
doctrine in labor cases, see generally Rubinstein, supra note 6, at 1-21.
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This article will trace the development of the after-acquired evidence
doctrine. Analyzing the doctrine's first application in Smalwood v.
United Air Lines, Inc.,' it will examine how the doctrine was expand-
ed in Summers v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,' and
applied in Johnson v. Honeywell Information Systems, Inc.,' Wash-
ington v. Lake County, Illinois,' and Welch v. Liberty Machine Works,
Inc.2 It will discuss the use of after-created evidence,' and the appli-
cability of after-acquired evidence to sexual harassment cases.' It will
then criticize the Summers formulation 3' and discuss why that formu-
lation was rejected in Wallace v. Dunn Construction Co.' and Mardell
v. Harleyville Insurance Co.' After pointing out the weaknesses of the
Wallace position,' the article will suggest, as an alternative to the
Summers and Wallace approaches, that after-acquired evidence should
bar a plaintiffs right to backpay only after the date the employer actu-
ally discovers the evidence.'
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE
The origin of the doctrine may be traced to Smallwood v. United
Airlines, Inc.,' which held, under limited circumstances, that after-ac-
quired evidence barred a civil rights action. Subsequent decisions, most
notably Summers v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co.,' have trans-
formed the doctrine into a pervasive and formidable defense.
24. 728 F.2d 614 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 832 (1984); see infra notes
36-61 and accompanying text.
25. 864 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1988); see infra notes 62-83 and accompanying text.
26. 955 F.2d 409 (6th Cir. 1992); see infra notes 84-99 and accompanying text.
27. 969 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1992); see irtfra notes 100-30 and accompanying text.
28. 23 F.3d 1403 (8th Cir. 1994); see infra notes 131-48.
29. See infra notes 150-56 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 157-67 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 168-81 and accompanying text.
32. 968 F.2d 1174 (11th Cir. 1992); see infra notes 182-221 and accompanying text.
33. 31 F.3d 1221 (3d Cir. 1994); see inifra notes 222-49 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 206-08, 254-55 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 250-65 and accompanying text.
36. 728 F.2d 614 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 832 (1984).
37. 864 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1988).
A. The Advent of the Doctrine: Smallwood v. United Air Lines
In Smallwood,' United refused to process Smallwood's application
for employment as a flight officer because Smallwood was older than
thirty-five, the maximum age United would consider for such employ-
ment.' Smallwood filed an age discrimination claim against United.'
While conducting discovery, United learned that Overseas National
Airlines (ONA), Smallwood's previous employer, had terminated him for
cause.4 ' At trial,42 United argued that it would not have hired
Smallwood had it known of his misconduct at ONA, and therefore
Smallwood was not entitled to any remedy under federal civil rights
law.' Although the district court expressed ambivalence as to whether
after-acquired evidence could provide a defense, it nevertheless consid-
ered the evidence and held that United had failed to carry its burden of
proving that it would not have hired Smallwood had it known of the
circumstances of the ONA discharge." On appeal, the Fourth Circuit
addressed the issue of whether the after-acquired evidence of
Smallwood's misconduct at ONA barred his right to relief in the dis-
crimination suit against United.' In deciding to allow the use of the
after acquired evidence, the Smallwood court relied heavily on Mount
Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle.'
In Mt. Healthy, a school board refused to rehire a teacher, because
38. 728 F.2d 614 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 832 (1984).
39. 728 F.2d at 615.
40. Id.; see Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-633 (1988)
(hereinafter "ADEA").
41. SmaUwood, 728 F.2d at 619. The two reasons for the ONA termination were
that Smallwood had misled ONA into paying for moving expenses that were not reim-
bursable, and that he had fraudulently charged ONA for transportation for his chil-
dren. Id. at 620.
42. This was the second trial of the case. The district court judge limited the first
trial to the issue of whether the employer could establish a BFOQ (bona fide occupa-
tional qualification) defense. Id. at 615.
43. Id. at 616. In addition to arguing that the after-acquired evidence doctrine
ought not to be applied at all, Smallwood raised two subsidiary arguments. First, he
argued unsuccessfully that character is irrelevant to one's qualifications to work as an
airline pilot. Id. at 625. Second, he contended that even if the after-acquired evidence
doctrine applied, he was entitled to backpay from the date of United's discriminatory
denial of his employment application until the date of the court's determination that
United would not have hired Smallwood had it know of his fraud at ONA. The court
rejected this argument. Id. at 626.
44. Id. at 616-17. Although the court admitted the after-acquired evidence, it stated
that it "is entitled to be and should be, skeptical of after-the-fact decisions as to
what the defendant would have done had it known what it knows now." Id. at 616.
45. Id. at 617, 620.
46. Id. (citing Mount Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle, 429
U.S. 274 (1977).
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he had (1) disclosed to a disc jockey the contents of an internal memo-
randum concerning a dress code which the disc jockey announced on
the radio, and (2) made obscene gestures to two female students in the
school cafeteria. 7 The teacher sued the board, alleging that his dis-
missal violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.' The Unit-
ed States Supreme Court agreed that disclosing the contents of the
memorandum was protected speech, but made no similar finding re-
garding the obscene gestures.4' The court went on to hold that even if
protected speech was a substantial factor in the board's decision, if the
board would in any event have fired the teacher for a legitimate rea-
son-making obscene gestures-the teacher was not entitled to relief.'
The Supreme Court said:
A rule of causation which focuses solely on whether protected conduct played a
part, 'substantial' or otherwise, in a decision not to rehire, could place an employ-
ee in a better position as a result of the exercise of constitutionally protected
conduct than he would have occupied had he done nothing .... The constitution-
al principle at stake is sufficiently vindicated if such an employee is placed in no
worse a position than if he had not engaged in the conduct."
The Fourth Circuit in Smalwood interpreted Mt. Healthy as an endorse-
ment of the after-acquired evidence doctrine.' "[T]he Supreme Court in-
47. Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 282-83.
'48. Id. at 276.
49. Id. at 284, 287.
50. Id. at 287.
51. Id. at 285-86.
52. Smallwood v. United Air Lines, Inc., 728 F.2d 614, 623 (4th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 832 (1984). Mt. Healthy and Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S.
228 (1989), which reaffirmed it, see infra notes 117-20 and accompanying text, were
implicitly overruled by a 1991 amendment to Title VII which provides that "an unlaw-
ful employment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that
race, color, religion, sex or national origin was a motivating factor for any employ-
ment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice." 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(m) (Supp. IV 1992). If, in addition to discrimination, a legitimate reason
contributed to the discharge, the court may take that factor into consideration in
fashioning the remedy. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1981). Since Summers v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1988) holds that victims of discrimination
are not "injured" if after-acquired evidence establishes that they would have been
fired, one commentator has argued that the 1991 amendment calls Summers into
question. Robert J. Gregory, The Use of After-Acquired Evidence in Employment
Discrimination Cases: Should the Guilty Employer Go Free? 9 LAB. LAW. 43, 61-62
(1993) (construing 42 U.S.C. § 20O0e-5(g)(2)(B)). Gregory believes that, under the 1991
amendment, a victim of discrimination may be entitled to injunctive relief, declaratory
relief and attorneys' fees, even if after-acquired evidence bars a make-whole remedy.
Id. However, it has also been argued that since Summers does not deny that the em-
structed district courts in cases where the issue is such as here that they
'should' proceed to make the 'after-the-fact rationale' which the district
court in this case deprecates."53
Having held that Mt. Healthy instructs courts to consider after-ac-
quired evidence as a defense to discrimination suits, the court articulated
a formulation of the doctrine.
The question is whether the plaintiff would not have been hired had the defendant
followed its normal procedure and processed the plaintiffs application as it did all
others. Such processing would have included inquiries of the plaintiffs former
airline employer as listed on his application form. That inquiry would have elicited
the full evidence of the circumstances of plaintiffs discharge by ONA. The infor-
mation received from ONA would have meant the plaintiff would never have been
hired by the defendant as a flight officer."
Finding these elements satisfied, the court reversed the district court's
determination.'
The Smallwood decision thus rested on United's ability to prove two
distinct elements, each requiring an inference of what would have oc-
curred. First, United had to prove that it would have discovered
Smallwood's misconduct at ONA in the normal course of processing his
application, even if it had not refused to hire him for discriminatory
reasons. Second, United had to show that it would not have hired
Smallwood if it had known of the misconduct.'
It is baffling how the court extracted this formulation from Mt.
Healthy, which involved a teacher actually fired for mixed motives, one
legitimate and the other illegal.57 In holding that a discharge is not ac-
tionable if the legitimate motive would have resulted in the discharge,
the Supreme Court was not inviting courts to engage in a guessing game
of what the employer would have discovered and what it would have
done based on the hypothetical discovery. The Supreme Court in Mt.
Healthy was simply not addressing the issue of whether after-acquired
evidence could be used to justify an otherwise illegal firing.
ployer has violated Title VII but merely denies the existence of an injury, the 1991
amendment does not contradict it. See William M. Muth, Jr., The After-Acquired Evi-
dence Doctrine in Title VII Cases and the Challenge Presented by Wallace v. Dunn
Construction Co., 968 F.2d 1174 (lth Cir. 1992), 72 NEB. L REV. 330, 343 (1993).
53. Smallwood, 728 F.2d at 623.
54. Id. at 626.
55. Id. at 627.
56. See Turnes v. AmSouth Bank, NA, 36 F.3d 1057 (lth Cir. 1994) (holding that
defendant, in refusal to hire case must prove that it would have discovered after-ac-
quired evidence in the course of the application review process and that it would not
have hired the plaintiff based on that evidence).
57. See supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text. Nor did Mt. Healthy involve
issues of discrimination, which pose public policy considerations not presented to the
Court. Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 274.
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Despite the suspect conceptual underpinnings of Smalwood, the after-
acquired evidence doctrine has developed beyond the confines set forth
in that case.' Later decisions applying the doctrine have either altered
or ignored the first' or second' elements of the test Smallwood articu-
lated, and the majority of courts apply the doctrine as a complete de-
fense to a discrimination lawsuit."'
B. The Use of After-Acquired Evidence To Disprove "Injury":
Summers v. State Farm
The seminal case, which reshaped the doctrine into an easily provable
defense, is Summers v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.'
This version of the doctrine is overwhelmingly the majority view.'
58. See infra notes 157-67 and accompanying text (discussing the application of
the after-acquired evidence doctrine as a complete defense in sexual harassment cas-
es).
59. Many courts have disregarded the first element of the Smawood rationale,
which requires that the employer would have discovered the after-acquired evidence
independent of the discrimination suit. See, e.g., O'Driscoll v. Hercules Inc., 12 F.3d
176, 179 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding that after-acquired evidence completely bars recov-
ery if the employer proves that it would have fired the employee based on the evi-
dence); McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 9 F.3d 539, 542 (6th Cir. 1993),
cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 2099 (1994) (same); O'Day v. McDonnell Douglas Helicopter
Co., 784 F. Supp. 1466, 1468 (D. Ariz. 1992) (same).
60. See, e.g., Johnson v. Honeywell Info. Sys., 955 F.2d 409, 414 (6th Cir. 1992)
(applying "would have fired" test in wrongful discharge case involving after-acquired
evidence of resume fraud); Malone v. Signal Processing Technologies, Inc., 826 F.
Supp. 370, 375 (D. Colo. 1993) (applying "would have fired" test in wrongful dis-
charge case involving after-acquired evidence of job misconduct); Van Deursen v.
United States Tobacco Sales & Mktg. Co., 839 F. Supp. 760, 764 (D. Colo. 1993) (ap-
plying both "would not have hired" and "would have fired" tests in wrongful dis-
charge case involving after-acquired evidence of resume fraud).
61. See, e.g., Honeywell, 955 F.2d at 415 (violation of state civil rights act); Wash-
ington v. Lake County, IM., 969 F.2d 250, 253 (7th Cir. 1992) (race discrimination);
Summers v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 700, 708 (10th Cir. 1988) (age
and race discrimination); Russell v. Microdyne Corp., 830 F. Supp. 305, 308 (E.D. Va.
1993) (sex discrimination); Redd v. Fisher Controls, 814 F. Supp. 547, 551 (W.D. Tex.
1992) (sex, race and age discrimination). But see Wallace v. Dunn Construction Co.,
968 F.2d 1174, 1181 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding that employer must show when evi-
dence would have been discovered to establish date terminating employee's entitle-
ment to backpay); contra Lohmann v. Towers, Perrin, Forster, & Crosby, Inc., H-91-
3586, 1992 WL 548195, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 28, 1992) (rejecting after-acquired evi-
dence doctrine based on state law).
62. 864 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1988).
63. See supra notes 9-14 and accompanying text.
Summers was an insurance claims adjuster for State Farm who forged
documents on behalf of claimants." State Farm discovered the forgeries,
and, after warning him that future falsifications would result in dis-
charge, examined randomly selected files to determine if Summers had
engaged in other improprieties.' Although the investigation revealed ad-
ditional misconduct, Summers was merely placed on probation for two
weeks without pay, because he had not profited from his wrongdoing.'
More than a year later, State Farm fired Summers, not for falsifying doc-
uments, but rather for his "poor attitude" and inability to get along with
co-workers.67 At the time of the discharge, Summers, a Mormon, was
fifty-six years old.M He sued State Farm for discrimination based on age
and religion.' Pre-trial disclosure revealed that Summers had falsified
150 additional documents, eighteen of them after State Farm had placed
him on probation.7" State Farm argued that if it had known of this mis-
conduct, it would have fired Summers."
The issue was whether Summers' pervasive fraud, discovered long
after his discharge, barred his recovery under federal civil rights law.'
The court decided that the after-acquired evidence deprived Summers of
the right to relief.' The Summers court agreed with the Smallwood
court's view that Mt. Healthy implicitly approved of the use of such evi-
dence to bar a discrimination claim.7' The Summers court likened Sum-
mers to a masquerading doctor:
[T]he present case is akin to the hypothetical wherein a company doctor is fired
because of his age, race, religion, and sex and the company, in defending a civil
rights action, thereafter discovers that the discharged employee was not a "doc-
tor." In our view, the masquerading doctor would be entitled to no relief, and
Summers is in no better position."
While recognizing that Summers' fraud was not a "cause" of his dis-
charge, the court found that because State Farm would have fired him
had it known of the misconduct, Summers could not prove legal "inju-
ry."76 Absent injury, the claimant was not entitled to relief, even assum-
64. Summers, 864 F.2d at 702.
65. "Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 702-03.
68. Id. at 702.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 703.
71. Id. at 708.
72. See id. at 704.
73. Id. at 704, 708.
74. Id. at 707.
75. Id. at 708.
76. Id.
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ing a civil rights violation had occurred.' The court therefore granted
State Farm's motion for summary judgment.'
Though both Smallwood and Summers adopted the after-acquired
evidence doctrine, their holdings differ in two substantial respects. First
and most significantly, Summers discarded the first element of the
Smallwood formulation and barred an employee from recovery regardless
of whether the employer would have discovered the misconduct indepen-
dent of the discrimination suit.' By eliminating this element, the Sum-
mers court removed a major hurdle to establishing an after-acquired
evidence defense. Second, Summers changed the second element of the
Smallwood formulation, substituting the "would not have hired" test,'
for the "would have fired" test.8' This distinction, however, may be more
theoretical than practical, because, as later cases show, employers have
been adept at meeting either test.
More disturbing than Summers' misreading of Mt. Healthy and
Smallwood is the tacit premise on which the Summers court grounded
its decision. Although it is undeniable that after-acquired evidence of
employee misconduct may relieve the employer of its contractual obliga-
tions to the employee,' Summers shields the employer with far broader
impunity. It holds that such evidence relieves the employer of a non-con-
tractual duty-the duty to abide by civil rights law. It applies, by logical
extension, even to sexual harassment' and common law torts.
C. Application of The Summers Doctrine to Resume Fraud:
Johnson v. Honeywell
In Summers, the Tenth Circuit applied the after-acquired evidence
77. Id.
78. Id. at 709.
79. See id at 706-07, 708 n.3.
80. Id.; see Murnane v. American Airlines, 667 F.2d 98 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (citing East
Texas Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395 (1977)). Since Smallwood
never worked for United, the court did not consider whether United would have fired
Smallwood, though theoretically the court could have applied the "would have fired"
test. See id. at 707; SmaUwood, 728 F.2d at 623.
81. Summers, 864 F.2d at 708. One writer has eschewed the significance of the
distinction between the "would not have hired" and "would have fired" tests, because
in either event, according to that writer, the discharged employee has no standing to
sue under Title VII. Muth, supra note 52, at 349; see infra notes 116-22 and accom-
panying text.
82. See infr notes 168-71 and accompanying text.
83. See infra notes 157-67 and accompanying text.
doctrine in a job misconduct case. The Sixth Circuit followed Summers
in Johnson v. Honeywell Information Systems, Inc., where it applied the
after-acquired evidence doctrine to resume fraud.' Johnson, a field rela-
tions manager for Honeywell, was responsible for assisting branch man-
agers in implementing affirmative action programs and for responding to
discrimination complaints." Fired ostensibly for poor job performance,
Johnson filed suit alleging that Honeywell discharged her because she
insisted on meeting affirmative action goals.' She asserted two claims
of retaliatory discharge, the first for violation of her employment con-
tract and the second for violation of Michigan's Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights
Act.' During discovery, Honeywell learned that Johnson had materially
misrepresented her education and work experience on her employment
application.' The application cautioned that any misrepresentation "may
be cause for immediate discharge."'
Honeywell moved for summary judgment on the contract claim based
on the after-acquired evidence of Johnson's "resume" fraud,' and for a
directed verdict on the state civil rights claim." The district court de-
nied the motion for summary judgment but granted the motion for a
84. 955 F.2d 409 (6th Cir. 1992).
85. Id. at 411.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. In an apparent attempt to meet the published job requirements, which in-
cluded a college education and significant work experience, Johnson stated that she
had received a Bachelor of Arts degree at the University of Detroit, though she had
completed only four courses at that institution. She also represented that she had
studied applied management at Wayne State University for one year. Wayne State had
no record of her ever having been enrolled. In addition, she exaggerated her duties
at prior jobs and falsely claimed that during the one-year hiatus between her last job
and her application to work at Honeywell she had managed her properties. Id. at
411-12.
89. Id. at 411. As in Johnson, the job application used in many resume fraud cas-
es admonishes that the employer might fire applicants for maldng misrepresentations.
However, most courts treat these warnings as establishing that the employer will
dismiss employees for resume fraud. See, e.g., O'Driscoll v. Hercules Inc., 12 F.3d
176, 178 (10th Cir. 1994) (The application said: "I understand that any misrepresenta-
tion made by me herein may result in the ... termination of employment.");
Washington v. Lake County, Ill., 969 F.2d 250, 252 (7th Cir. 1992) (The application
said: "I agree that if any misrepresentation has been made by me . . . any offer of
employment may be withdrawn or my employment terminated immediately . . .");
Redd v. Fisher Controls, 814 F. Supp. 547, 551 (W.D. Tex. 1992) (The application
said: "I UNDERSTAND AND AGREE THAT ANY FALSE INFORMATION OR CONSE-
QUENTIAL OMISSION CONTAINED IN MY APPLICATION IS CAUSE FOR DIS-
CHARGE.").
90. Johnson, 955 F.2d at 412.
91. Id.
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directed verdict.92
Adopting the Summers formulation of the after-acquired evidence
doctrine, the court summarized its elements as follows:
In order to provide a defense to an employer in a wrongful discharge claim, the
after-acquired evidence must establish valid and legitimate reasons for the termi-
nation of employment. As a general rule, in cases of resume fraud, summary judg-
ment will be appropriate where the misrepresentation or omission was material,
directly related to measuring a candidate for employment, and was relied upon by
the employer in maldng the hiring decision."
Explaining the reliance element, the court noted that the question was
whether Honeywell would have hired Johnson if it had known that she
did not possess a college degree.' 4 In support of the motion, the person
who hired Johnson submitted an affidavit asserting, as one might predict,
that he would not have hired or even interviewed Johnson had he known
that she was not college educated.' He also stated that he hired four
other field relations managers at approximately the same time he hired
Johnson, and that in each instance he relied on the applicant's represen-
tation of having graduated from college. The court found these perfunc-
tory assertions sufficient to warrant reversing the district court and
granting summary judgment."
The court next reviewed and affirnmed the district court's directed
verdict in favor of Honeywell on the state civil rights claim.' Agreeing
with the rationale of Summers, the court said: "Because Honeywell es-
tablished that it would not have hired Johnson and that it would have
fired her had it become aware of her resume fraud during her employ-
ment, Johnson is entitled to no relief, even if she could prove a violation
of Elliott-Larsen. "
. The court's analysis is perplexing; it used the "would not have hired"
test to decide the contract claim, while applying a combination "would
not have hired" and "would have fired" test to decide the state civil
92. Id.
93. Id. at 414 (citing Churchman v. Pinkerton's, Inc., 756 F. Supp. 515, 520 (D.
Kan. 1991)). The court observed that "[tihese requirements are necessary to prevent
an employer from combing a discharged employee's record for evidence of any and
all misrepresentations, no matter how minor or trivial, in an effort to avoid legal re-
sponsibility for an otherwise impermissible discharge." Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 415.
97. Id.
98. Id.
rights law claim.' Even more distressing than the court's analytic short-
comings was the ease with which it granted Honeywell summary judg-
ment.
D. Analysis of the "Would Not Have Hired" and 'Would Have Fired"
Tests: Washington v. Lake County
The Johnson court did not explain why it intermixed the "would not
have hired" and "would have fired" tests." The Seventh Circuit aligned
itself with Summers in Washington v. Lake County, Illinois ° and of-
fered an analysis of when these tests should apply." Washington, an
African-American, was a jailer at the Lake County Sheriffs Depart-
ment.l" He had been on the job less than a year when the department
discharged him.' Only two months before the firing, Washington
earned excellent and proficient ratings and received no scores in the
adequate or marginal range." He filed suit alleging racial discrimina-
tion."
After the case began, the department discovered that Washington had
lied on his job application, which asked if he had ever been convicted of
a crime. 7 Washington had concealed a guilty plea to a criminal tres-
pass charge and a third-degree assault conviction." The application,
which explained that a conviction record is not an automatic bar to em-
ployment, warned that any misrepresentation might result in the with-
drawal of an offer of employment or job termination.
The department moved for summary judgment, relying on the after-
acquired evidence doctrine. "' Washington argued that summary
judgment was inappropriate because a question of fact remained as to
whether the department would have hired him or would have fired him
had it known of his criminal record."'
The court reasoned that there is a crucial distinction between the
"would not have hired" and "would have fired" tests."' An employer,
99. Id. at 414-15.
100. Id.
101. 969 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1992).
102. See infra notes 112-16 and accompanying text.
103. Washington, 969 F.2d at 251.






110. Id. at 252.
111. Id. at 253.
112. Id. at 254-55.
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the court said, might not hire an applicant who misrepresented his back-
ground, especially if the misrepresentations bore a relationship to job
qualifications."3 However, if the misrepresentations come to light after
the employee is performing capably on the job, the employer may be
disinclined to fire him."4 The court recognized that where the chal-
lenged employment decision is a refusal to hire, such as in Smallwood,
the "would not have hired" test is appropriate. 5 However, in cases al-
leging wrongful discharge, the relevant inquiry is whether the employer
would have fired the employee based on the after-acquired evidence."'
To support its adoption of the "would have fired" standard in wrongful
discharge cases, the court raised two arguments. First, it invoked the
expansive interpretation of Mt. Healthy expressed in Smallwood and
relied on a more recent Supreme Court case, Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins,"7 which applied the Mt. Healthy "mixed motives" analysis to a
Title VII claim."8 Since the relevant inquiry in Mt. Healthy and Price
Waterhouse was whether the employer would have reached the same em-
ployment decision-to fire the employee-based on a legitimate rea-
son,"9 the proper inquiry in a situation involving after-acquired evidence
is the same. 2 ' Second, it argued that "[flocusing on whether the appli-
cant would have been hired is an unjustified importation of 'property
right' concepts into employment discrimination law."' To prove this
point, the court observed that civil rights law protects at-will employees,
even though by definition they have no property right to their jobs."n
113. Id.
114. Id. at 254.
115. Id. at 255-56, n.5.
116. Id. at 256.
117. 490 U.S. 228 (1989). In Price Waterhouse, Hopkins, a woman, was eligible for
partnership in an accounting firm. Id. at 231. When the firm denied her partnership,
she brought a Title VII lawsuit based on gender discrimination. Id. at 232. The firm
responded that it rejected her because she was abrasive and could not get along
with staff. Id. at 234-35. As in Mt. Healthy, the court held that to show a violation
of Title VII the plaintiff must "prove that the employer relied upon sex-based consid-
erations in coming to its decision." Id. at 241-42. The burden then shifts to the defen-
dant to prove that "it would have made the same decision even if it had not allowed
gender to play such a role." Id. at 244-45.
118. Washington, 969 F.2d at 255 (citing Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 242).
119. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 has overruled the mixed-motives analysis Mt.
Healthy and Price Waterhouse. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
120. Washington, 969 F.2d at 255.
121. Id. at 256.
122. Id.
This reasoning is flawed. The "would not have hired" test does not en-
graft property right concepts into civil rights law. Rather, it is a test of
causation, although a hypothetical one, which asks whether the legiti-
mate reason for not hiring the employee would have preceded the action
of discrimination and prevented it from ever having occurred. Summers
does not deny that civil rights law covers at-will employees though they
have no property right to their jobs. It holds, however, that after-acquired
evidence deprives them of the protection of that law.
The court concluded that the department would have fired Washington
if it had known of his criminal record, and accordingly, affirmed the
district court's grant of summary judgment for Lake County."2 The
court based its conclusion on affidavits submitted by the Lake County
Sheriff and Superintendent of Jails, both asserting that Washington
would have been discharged for his criminal record."u The court em-
phasized that Washington failed to contradict these assertions.l" Yet,
Washington did present uncontroverted proof that the department merely
suspended for three days a white female officer, involved in a hit-and-run
accident and arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol and leav-
ing the scene of an accident. '26 He also apprised the court of the posi-
tive job appraisals he had earned.127 Finally, Washington pointed out
that there was neither a departmental policy of, nor a history of firing
officers who had lied on their employment applications." The court
held that Washington's assertions did not create a material issue of
fact. " One must shudder at the daunting evidentiary burden placed on
employees who, on a motion for summary judgment, seek to rebut the
hypothetical, self-serving declarations of their employers."n
E. The "Substantial Burden" Test: Welch v. Liberty Machine
The Eighth Circuit recently adopted the Summers formulation in Welch
123. Id. at 256-57.
124. Id. at 256.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 252.
127. Id. at 257.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See generally William S. Waldo & Rosemary A. Mahar, Lost Cause and Found
Defense: Using Evidence Discovered After an Employee's Discharge to Bar Discrimi-
nation Claims, 9 LAB. L 31, 40 (1993) (commenting that, although courts recognize
that employer affidavits submitted on motions for summary judgment in discrimina-
tion cases are self-serving, they are disposed to granting such motions absent con-
crete rebuttal evidence); Pauline Yoo, After-Acquired Evidence Doctrine, 25 CoLUM.
HUM. RTs. L. REV. 219, 242-43 (criticizing Summers rule for inappropriately encourag-
ing summary judgment in employment discrimination cases).
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v. Liberty Machine Works, Inc. 131 In doing so, the court increased the
evidentiary burden required of employers seeking summary judgment,
ameliorating the oppressive consequences of granting such motions
based on flimsy attestations." One must hope that other courts follow-
ing Summers have the good sense to use the Welch approach to summa-
ry judgment. In Welch, Liberty hired Welch as a machinist for a ninety
day probationary period."3 Two months into the period, Welch reported
to Liberty that he needed surgery." One week later, Liberty fired him
allegedly for "lack of work."" Welch commenced a wrongful discharge
action under ERISA and a handicap discrimination action under the Mis-
souri Human Rights Act."M During discovery, Liberty learned that Welch
had failed to disclose that his former employer terminated him for
cause.'37 Liberty moved for summary judgment based on an affidavit
from its president asserting that Liberty would not have hired Welch if it
had known of the previous discharges" and would have fired Welch
because he lied on the job application."
The court adopted the Summers doctrine because it believed that an
employee should not benefit from his own fraud. 4" Contrary to
Washington,' which used the "would have fired" test in a discharge
case, the Welch court applied the "would not have hired test" because the
case involved application fraud.' Reversing the lower court's grant of
summary judgment, the Eighth Circuit was wary of relying on a single,
"self-serving" affidavit." The court explained: "[W]e believe that the
employer bears a substantial burden of establishing that the policy pre-
dated the hiring and firing of the employee in question and that the poli-
cy constitutes more than a mere contract or employment application
boilerplate."'"
131. 23 F.3d 1403, 1405 (8th Cir. 1994).
132. Id. at 1406.






139. Id. The application warned: "[A]ny misstatement or omission of fact on this
application shall be considered cause for dismissal." Id. at 1404.
140. Id. at 1405.
141. Washington v. Lake County, Ill., 969 F.2d 250, 256 (7th Cir. 1992).
142. Welch, 23 F.3d at 1403.
143. Id. at 1405.
144. Id.
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Arnold endorsed Wallace.'5 He argued
that, based on after-acquired evidence of application fraud, no one would
excuse Liberty if it had committed a battery against Welch." Excusing
wrongful discharge for such fraud was, in his view, similarly
unsupportable.'47
Although Judge Arnold's argument is plausible, a supporter of Sum-
mers might respond that firing an employee who has committed resume
fraud inflicts no injury because the employer would have fired him based
on the after-acquired evidence. By contrast, committing a battery in-
volves a separate injury that after-acquired evidence does not justify.
Judge Arnold should have focused on whether a discriminatory discharge
of an employee guilty of application fraud entails an injury separate from
the injury resulting from breach of contract."
III. IMPLAUSIBLE EXTENSIONS OF THE DOCTRINE
The Summers doctrine encourages employers to invent after-the-fact
justifications for otherwise illegal discharges and, more critically, it con-
dones discriminatory conduct.'49 The decisions discussed below exacer-
bate these concerns.
A. After-Created Evidence
The problem of employer manufactured evidence reached unanticipat-
ed heights in Puhy v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., where the court consid-
ered evidence that was not only after-acquired but was also after-created.
Puhy applied to Delta for the positions of pilot and flight engineer.1 51
When Delta denied the application, Puhy commenced an action alleging
age discrimination." In an effort aimed at settlement, Delta consented
145. Id. at 1406 (Arnold, J., dissenting).
146. Id. (Arnold, J., dissenting).
147. Id. (Arnold, J., dissenting).
148. See infra notes 168-76 and accompanying text.
149. In McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 9 F.3d 539, 543 (6th Cir.
1993), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 2099 (1994), the employee asserted that she removed
confidential documents belonging to her employer to protect herself against an antici-
pated discriminatory discharge. Id. at 543. She argued thaO, under these circumstanc-
es, the court should not allow her employer to rely on the after-acquired evidence of
her removal of the files. Id. The court rejected this argument because "[tihe sole
issue in after-acquired evidence cases is whether the employer would have fired the
plaintiff employee on the basis of the misconduct had it known of the misconduct."
Id.
150. 833 F. Supp. 1577 (N.D. Ga. 1993).
151. Id. at 1578.
152. Id.
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to process Puhy's application, despite the pending lawsuit. Delta's out-
side industrial psychologists administered a battery of tests to Puhy, and
ostensibly based on his poor performance, Delta again refused to employ
him."n Delta moved for summary judgment submitting the test results
as after-acquired evidence demonstrating that Delta would not have hired
Puhy.'5
4
The court accepted the test results as after-acquired evidence which
theoretically could bar recovery," but nevertheless denied the motion
because material issues of fact existed as to whether Delta would not
have hired Puhy based on the test results."a
All other cases involve after-acquired evidence in existence before an
alleged discrimination. Puhy is troubling because the after-acquired evi-
dence was created at Delta's behest after Delta denied Puhy employment.
This case offers employers the option of fashioning their own after-ac-
quired evidence if none is to be found elsewhere.
B. After-Acquired Evidence Excusing Sexual Harassment
At least three district courts have applied the after-acquired evidence
doctrine to bar claims of sexual harassment.'57 The most recent such
153. Id. at 1578-79.
154. Id. at 1580.
155. Id. at 1582. The court believed it was in accord with Wallace v. Dunn Constr.
Co., 968 F.2d 1174 (lth Cir. 1992), reh'g granted, No. 91-7406, 1994 WL 481439
(Sept. 6, 1994). It observed that the "dominant concern in the Wallace opinion was
preventing the use of the after-acquired evidence to 'placefl plaintiff in a worse posi-
tion than if he had not been a member of the protected class.'" Puhy, 833 F. Supp.
at 1582 (quoting Wallace, 968 F.2d at 1179). The Puhy court reasoned that, since
Puhy was jobless when he applied to Delta for employment, the alleged discrimina-
tion did not place him in a worse position than he would have occupied absent the
discrimination. Id. This reading misconstrues Wallace. The questions Wallace asks are
whether Puhy would have been hired absent the discrimination (since Puhy is a
refusal to hire case), and when Delta would have discovered the after-acquired evi-
dence independent of the lawsuit Wallace, 968 F.2d at 1181-82. Puhy's joblessness
does not, under Wallace, disqualify him for relief. Id.
156. Id. at 1586.
157. See Russell v. Microdyne Corp., 830 F. Supp. 305 (E.D. Va. 1993) (alleging
sexual discrimination and sexual harassment); Churchman v. Pinkerton's, Inc., 756 F.
Supp. 515 (D. Kan. 1991) (alleging constructive discharge in retaliation for reporting
sexual harassment); Mathis v. Boeing Military Airplane Co., 719 F. Supp. 991 (D. Kan.
1989) (alleging discriminatory discharge based on race and sex in addition to sexual
harassment); contra Doe v. Marshalis, Inc., Nos. 3-92-463, 3-93-267, 1994 WL 66061, *3
(D. Minn. Jan. 10, 1994) (rejecting the after-acquired evidence doctrine where employ-
case is Russell v. Microdyne Corp." While still employed at Microdyne,
Russell filed claims for sexual harassment and sex discrimination claims
for the denial of promotions and raises. " During the litigation,
Microdyne discovered that Russell had falsely stated on her job applica-
tion that she was currently employed. In truth, the stated employer laid
her off ten months before she applied for the job at Microdyne.'" More-
over, she grossly exaggerated her prior salary."6 '
Typical self-serving submissions convinced the court that Microdyne
would have fired Russell upon learning of her fraud and that her reten-
tion resulted from Microdyne's desire to avoid the appearance of retalia-
tory discharge." Although the fact pattern was novel in that Microdyne
had not fired Russell, the court nevertheless applied the after-acquired
evidence doctrine."n It reasoned that discriminatory refusal to promote
is less harmful to an employee than discriminatory discharge.'" Thus, if
after-acquired evidence of employee misconduct bars recovery in a dis-
charge case, such evidence should likewise bar recovery in a case where
the employer has unfairly refused to promote the employee."® In grant-
ing Microdyne's motion for summary judgment,'d thereby disposing of
Russell's sexual harassment claim, the court stated in alarmingly broad
language that "[i]f an employee never would have been discharged due to
fraudulent statements, no recovery is warranted, regardless of any al-
leged adverse employment actions against the plaintiff." 7 The court
failed to explain or even comment on how after-acquired evidence of
employee misconduct can justify sexual harassment.
WY. THE FALLACY OF THE SUMMERS RATIONALE
The Summers formulation of the after-acquired evidence doctrine
misapplies a sound principle of contract law to a wholly inappropriate
area-discrimination law. A body of contract cases holds that if an em-
ployer fires an employee and learns later of employee misconduct justify-
ing termination, the court will dismiss the employee's wrongful discharge
ee alleged discriminatory discharge and sexual harassment).
158. 830 F. Supp. 305 (E.D. Va. 1993).
159. Id. at 306.
160. Id. at 307.
161. Id.




166. Id. at 309. The RusseU court's extension of the after-acquired evidence doctrine
to a refusal to promote case follows logically from Summers. If discharge causes no
injury, neither does obstructing an employee's advancement.
167. Id. at 307.
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claim based on the after-acquired evidence of misconduct." Although
the courts have generally applied this rule of contract law to on-the-job
misconduct cases, since an employee's material fraud on a job applica-
tion justifies discharge," the same principle of contract law should ap-
ply to resume fraud cases. This rule makes sense in the context of con-
tract law because an employee who breaches an employment agreement
loses the right to benefit from the agreement.7 Therefore, the employ-
ee suffers no injury from the employer's rescission of the contract. 71
168. See, e.g., Leahey v. Federal Express Corp., 685 F. Supp. 127, 128 (E.D. Va.
1988) (refusing, under Virginia law, to preclude after-acquired evidence of racial slurs
and sexual harassment of discharged employee); Von Heyne v. Tompkins, 93 N.W.
901 (Minn. 1903) (ruling that acts of employee misconduct in operating farm justified
dismissal of employee although employer did not know of the derelictions when he
discharged the employee); Masonite Corp. v. Handshoe, 44 So. 2d 41, 4345 (Miss.
1950) (upholding admissibility of after-acquired evidence of discharged engineer's in-
competence and unruliness to justify termination); Marnon v. Vaughan Motor Co., 219
P.2d 163, 167 (Or. 1950) (holding that agent's acceptance of secret profits justified his
termination although principal did not know of misconduct at time of firing); Loos v.
Geo. Walter Brewing Co., 129 N.W. 645, 646 (Wis. 1911) (stating that "[i]f misconduct
amounting to a breach of contract exists at the time of a discharge, the master can
justify under it irrespective of whether or not he knew it' at the time of the dis-
charge"); Kilian v. Ferrous Magnetic Corp., 280 N.Y.S. 909, 910 (N.Y. App. Div. 1935)
(observing that "[blad motive[s] for strict insistence on legal rights, or even ignorance
of a sufficient cause at the time of discharge, does not preclude defendant from justi-
fying its act"). But see Barrett v. ASARCO Inc., 763 P.2d 27, 31-33 (Mont. 1988)
(holding after-acquired evidence of employee dishonesty admissible on the issue of
character declining to address its use as after-acquired evidence to justify an other-
wise wrongful discharge) (citing Flanigan v. Prudential Fed. Savings & Loan, 720 P.2d
257 (Mont. 1986)), overruled in part on other grounds, Bache v. Gilden, 827 P.2d
817, (Mont. 1992); contra Lohmann v. Towers, Perrin, Forster, & Crosby, Inc., Civ. A.
No. H-91-3586, 1992 WL 548195, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 28, 1992). See generally 3A
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 762, at 526 (1960); WILuSTON ON CONTRACTS § 839, at 723
(Rev. Ed. 1938).
169. Morgan v. City of Jasper, 959 F.2d 1542, 1548-50 (11th Cir. 1992) (stating that
misrepresenting reasons for termination of previous employment is valid grounds for
discharge); Douglas v. Levingston Shipbuilding Co., 617 S.W.2d 718, 719-20 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1979) (holding that employee's concealment on employment application of iden-
tity of former employer, medical condition, and receipt of Worker's Compensation
benefits afforded employer defense to wrongful discharge claim); Robitzek v. Reliance
Intercontinental Corp., 183 N.Y.S.2d 870 (N.Y. App. Div. 1959) (granting summary
judgment to employer based on employee's misrepresentation of educational back-
ground), affd, 167 N.E.2d 74, 75 (N.Y. 1960).
170. See John P. Furfaro & Maury B. Josephson, After-Acquired Evidence, N.Y.LJ.,
at 3, col. 1 (June 6, 1993).
171. Summers holds that, even assuming the employer has violated civil rights law,
after-acquired evidence may disprove "injury," and hence defeat a discrimination
However, an employee's prior breach of an employment agreement or
fraud should not excuse unlawful discrimination or the injury it causes.
Discrimination is a statutory wrong analogous to a tort."72 It is illegal as
a matter of federal law and public policy."7 The urgency of the public
policy to eradicate discrimination 74 arguably elevates the inviolability of
civil rights law even above tort law."'5
The civil rights law creates duties of the employer that are indepen-
dent of the obligation to perform a contract. One such duty is not to fire
employees for discriminatory reasons. A violation of civil rights law is an
act of wrongdoing separate from a breach of an employment con-
tract. 1
76
claim. Summers v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 700, 708 (10th Cir. 1988).
172. One commentator has argued that the "public enforcement function" of every
civil right case is as important as the assessment of damages. Thus, even if injury
cannot be established, a trial on the issue of liability is imperative to expose the
wrongdoer and deter future acts of discrimination. Gregory, supra note 52, at 47-48.
173. Some have observed that Summers undermines the public policy embodied in
federal civil rights law, which is to eradicate unlawful discrimination. Wallace v.
Dunn Const Co., 968 F.2d 1174, 1180 (11th Cir. 1992). The Wallace court commented
that Summers is incompatible with the principal purpose of Title VII-"to achieve
equality of employment opportunity" by giving employers incentives "to self-examine
and self-evaluate their employment practices and to endeavor to eliminate so far as
possible" discrimination in employment. Id. (citations omitted) (citing Albemarle Paper
Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975) (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424, 429, 30 (1971) and United States v. N.L. Indus., 479 F.2d 354, 379 (8th Cir.
1973))); see Gregory, supra note 52, at 62 (criticizing the rationale of Summers).
174. See, e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421 (1975) (emphasizing
that the central purpose of Title VII is to "eradicat[e] discrimination throughout the
economy and mak[e] persons whole from injuries through past discriminations");
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973) (stating that "[tIthe lan-
guage of Title VII makes plain the purpose of Congress to assure equality of employ-
ment opportunities and to eliminate those discriminatory practices and devices which
have fostered racially stratified job environments to the disadvantage of minority citi-
zens"), affd, 528 F.2d 1102 (1976); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30
(1971) (instructing that the purpose of Title VII is "to achieve equality of employment
opportunities . . .").
175. Paul J. Gudel, Beyond Causation: The Interpretation of Action and the Mixed
Motives Problem in Employment Discrimination Law, 70 TEx. L REV. 17, 98 (1991)
("Title VII has a purpose different from that of tort law; Title VII exists to strike
down an entire socio-economic structure of conduct (which it forbids). and attitudes
and expectations (which it is meant to change by the moral force and suasion of the
law).").
176. Cf. Smith v. Secretary of Navy, 659 F.2d 1113, 1120 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (declaring
that unlawful discrimination is "a wrong in itself"). See generally Cheryl K. Zemeiman,
The After-Acquired Evidence Defense in Employment Discrimination Claims: The
Privatization of Title VII and the Contours of Social Responsibility, 46 STAN. L REV.
175, 200-01 (1993) (criticizing the use of the breach of contract defense in employ-
ment discrimination cases).
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Confusion lurks in the Summers rationale, which rests on the premise
that a victim of discrimination, who might have been fired for a legiti-
mate reason, has suffered no injury.'" Firing an employee for unlawful
discriminatory reasons breaches the statutory duty imposed by federal
civil rights law and inflicts the injury of job loss. This injury is separate
from the injury caused by a breach of contract because it arises from an
independent duty. The victim must be compensated for the resulting loss,
even though the same loss may not compensable under contract theo-
ry.178
A proponent of the Summers position might argue that the so-called
"employee" was not really an employee at all. " Since the employer
would have fired the employee for misconduct, the employment relation-
ship was a sham that deprived the "employee," who might have been
characterized as an impostor, of the protection of civil rights law. The
answer to this argument is that until discharged, the employee's status is
unimpaired and the employer is obliged by federal law not to deny the
employee a job through discrimination.ln The consequence of failing to
satisfy that obligation is paying the employee damages arising from loss
of the job.
Sexual harassment is perhaps the most striking illustration of discrimi-
natory conduct to which the Summers rationale is inapplicable' be-
cause it is apparent that sexual harassment causes injury independent of
the loss occasioned by a breach of contract. It would be absurd to ex-
cuse an employer's deliberate assault or slander of the employee based
on evidence discovered after-the-fact that the employee engaged in re-
sume fraud. It is equally untenable to excuse sexual harassment under
the same circumstances. The employee is injured in both cases.
177. Summers v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 700, 708 (10th Cir. 1988).
178. An at-will employee, who by definition is employed for an indefinite period,
may ordinarily be fired for nearly any reason or no reason at all. See Abney v. Bap-
tist Medical Ctrs., 597 So. 2d 682, 683 (Ala. 1992); Murphy v. American Home Prod.
Corp., 448 N.E.2d 86, 91 (N.Y. 1983); Lynas v. Maxwell Farms, 273 N.W. 315, 317
(Mich. 1937); Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 319 A.2d 174, 176 (Pa. 1974). Even
an employee at-will comes within the protection of federal civil rights law. See Wash-
ington v. Lake County, 11l., 969 F.2d 250, 256 (7th Cir. 1992). Therefore, firing an
employee at-will in violation of civil rights law, like firing a contractual employee,
inflicts injury.
179. See infra notes 213-18 and accompanying text.
180. See infra notes 219-21 and accompanying text.
181. But see supra notes 157-67 and accompanying text.
V. REJECTION OF SUMMERS
The Third and Eleventh Circuit courts have rejected the Summers
formulation, and have adopted approaches more restrictive to the use of
after-acquired evidence. Although these courts correctly recognize inade-
quacies in the Summers position, the alternatives they propose are equal-
ly unacceptable.
A. The First Assault on Summers: Wallace v. Dunn Construction
The Eleventh Circuit was the first circuit to resist the Summers for-
mulation of the after-acquired evidence doctrine.'" In Wallace v. Dunn
Construction Co.,' the court reverted to the Smallwood rationale, re-
quiring the employer to prove that it would have discovered the after-ac-
quired evidence absent the discrimination suit." Neil, who had worked
for Dunn as a flagperson on road crews, commenced an action against
Dunn for federal civil rights violations.'" At her deposition, Neil admit-
ted that she had entered a plea of guilty to possession of cocaine and
marijuana before submitting her job application to Dunn." She denied
on the job application that she had ever been convicted of a crime.'87
Soon after discovering Neil's misrepresentation, Dunn moved for summa-
ry judgment, arguing that the after-acquired evidence established a de-
fense to the discrimination claims.M
The Eleventh Circuit rejected the Summers formulation of the after-
acquired evidence doctrine and criticized the Summers court for basing
its holding on a flawed reading of Mt. Healthy." Seizing upon the very
language in Mt. Healthy that Summers relied on, the Wallace court re-
jected the Summers doctrine."M Thus, the court revisited the fecund Mt.
Healthy passage that instructs: "'The constitutional principle at stake is
sufficiently vindicated if such an employee is placed in no worse posi-
tion than if he had not engaged in the conduct.'"'9 ' The court argued
182. The Eleventh Circuit's grant of rehearing en banc in Wallace calls into question
its continuing rejection of Summers. No. 91-7406, 1994 WL 481439 (11th Cir. Sept. 6,
1994).
183. 968 F.2d 1174 (11th Cir. 1992), reh'g granted, No. 91-7406, 1994 WL 481439
(Sept. 6, 1994).
184. Id. at 1182. See supra notes 38-61 and accompanying text.
185. Wallace, 968 F.2d at 1176.
186. Id. at 1176-77.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 1177.
189. Id. at 1178-80.
190. Id. at 1179.
191. Id. (quoting Mt. Healthy v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 286 (1977)) (emphasis added
by the Wallace court).
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that, in using after-acquired evidence as the basis to dismiss Summers'
claim, the Tenth Circuit placed Summers in a worse position than if he
had not been a member of a protected class."9 The court explained that
absent age and religious discrimination, Summers would have remained
employed for some period beyond his discharge." Nevertheless, the
Tenth Circuit denied him relief even for injury occurring during that
period." The Wallace court attributed the Tenth Circuit's interpretive
error to a confusion of the hypothetical with the actual. "Whereas the
Mt. Healthy rule excuses all liability based on what actually would have
happened absent the unlawful motive, the Summers rule goes one step
further it excuses all liability based on what hypothetically would have
occurred assuming the employer had knowledge [of employee
wrongdoing]."'
The Wallace interpretation of Mt. Healthy is as dubious as the Sum-
mers interpretation. Mt. Healthy did not address the issue of after-ac-
quired evidence. Both Wallace and Summers have ascribed unintended
nuances to an out-of-context sentence.
The Wallace court also defended its departure from Summers by
charging that Summers discourages employers from eliminating illegal
discrimination." Rather, it fosters disobedience; employers may be-
come lax in their observance of civil rights laws,' knowing that they
can escape responsibility by rummaging through the background of il-
legally discharged employees until they contrive a justification for the
discharge."
192. Id. Discharge for being a member of a protected class under the civil rights
laws, the situation in both Summers and Wallace, is arguably analogous to discharge
for engaging in protected speech, the situation in Mt. Healthy. However, different
policy considerations apply in the two situations.
193. Id. at 1179-80.
194. Id. at 1180.
195. Id. at 1179.
196. Id. at 1180.
197. The argument that use of the after-acquired evidence doctrine will deter em-
ployee misconduct is unpersuasive. An employee who lies to get a job or who engag-
es in job misconduct is not likely contemplating how the misconduct might affect the
theoretical possibility of a discrimination suit. See Gregory, supra note 52, at 56.
198. Wallace, 968 F.2d at 1180. It has been suggested that in the case of resume
fraud this fear is unjustified because the after-acquired evidence doctrine will be ap-
plied only if the fraud was (1) material, (2) relevant to job qualifications, and (3) re-
lied on by the employer in making the hiring decision. Johnson v. Honeywell Info.
Systems, Inc., 955 F.2d 409, 414. One commentator, decrying this concern, has noted
that courts, in discrimination cases, look at the practices of employers to discern
After expressing this serious criticism of Summers, the Wallace court
leaped into the absurd. It stated:
Even more troubling is the incentive to 'sandbag.' Summers encourages an em-
ployer with a proclivity for unlawful motives to hire a woman-despite knowledge
of a legitimate reason that would normally cause the employer not to employ
her-to destroy any evidence of such knowledge, to pay her less on the basis of
her gender, to sexually harass her until she protests, to discharge her, and to
'discover' the legitimate motive during the ensuing litigation, thus escaping any
liability for the unlawful treatment of the erstwhile employee."
The spectre of scheming employers weaving diabolical plots to oppress
the innocent is a matter of grave concern only in the imaginations of the
judges who decided Wallace.'
In fashioning its own approach, the Waltace court stressed that the law
should make victims whole for injuries caused by unlawful discrimina-
tion, while respecting employers' lawful prerogatives."I If an employer
would have fired an employee, based on after-acquired evidence, the
employee should not receive front pay or reinstatement.' Such an
award would go beyond making the employee whole and would deny the
employer's right to terminate the employment for a legitimate reason.'
Backpay, according to the court, is a different matter. If the employer
can prove that it would have discovered the after-acquired evidence prior
to what otherwise would have been the end of the backpay period (pre-
sumably the date of judgment),'s the hypothetical date of discovery ter-
minates the employee's entitlement to backpay.'
This complex formulation is as unworkable as it is senseless. Asking
whether they have treated other employees in like circumstances similarly to how
they treated the employee claiming discrimination. Muth, supra note 52, at 347. These
assurances offer little solace to the discharged employee. Once an employee sues al-
leging discrimination, it is in the employer's interest to search the employee's past for
job-related misconduct. See, e.g., Rubinstein, supra note 6, at 28 (questioning the
wisdom of a rule that "allows an employer to cover up illegal activities by searching
an employee's past for unknown falsifications"). If such evidence is found, the dis-
charged employee's ex-supervisors will swear that the employer would not have hired
and would have fired the employee based on the newly-discovered misconduct. It is
difficult for employees to refute assertions of what others would have done.
199. Wallace, 968 F.2d at 1180-81.
200. The expense of implementing such a conspiracy and defending the victim's
inevitable lawsuit would thankfully render such evil conduct cost ineffective. See
Muth, supra note 52, at 348.
201. Wallace, 968 F.2d at 1181.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 1182.
204. See Massey v. Trump Castle Hotel & Casino, 828 F. Supp. 314, 323 (D.N.J.
1993) (agreeing with Wallace that backpay should be available to the aggrieved em-
ployee until the date of judgment).
205. Wallace, 968 F.2d at 1182.
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employers to prove that they would have discovered after-acquired evi-
dence from an independent source at a definite time is a question of
such perplexity that they will have to polish their crystal balls and con-
suit their astrologers.
Although the court recognized a reasonable alternative to its confound-
ing rule-to end the period of backpay when the employer actually
learned of the after-acquired evidence-it rejected this more sensible
approach.
[The alternative approach] overlooks the teaching of Price Waterhouse and Mt.
Healthy that the victim should be placed in no worse a position than if she were
not a member of a protected class and had not engaged in protected conduct-if
the allegedly unlawful acts did not occur, and this litigation never existed, then
Dunn would not have discovered Neil's prior conviction at her deposition.m
The Wallace court's reasoning contradicts the part of its decision that
denied the right to front pay. To use the court's own words, "if the alleg-
edly unlawful acts did not occur, and this litigation never existed, Dunn
would not have discovered Neil's prior convictions. " ' Absent the after-
acquired evidence of Neil's convictions and misrepresentations concern-
ing the convictions, Dunn would have had no basis to fire Neil. As a
result, Neil would have received pay on a "going forward" basis. It fol-
lows, under the Wallace rationale, that Neil should be entitled to front
pay and reinstatement, although the court denied the availability of these
remedies.'
The court reached predictable results. Dunn submitted the usual litany
of self-serving evidence to show that it would not have hired Neil had it
known of her criminal convictions, and would have fired her if it had
known that she had lied on her job application.' Neil was unable to
206. Id. The court bristled at the "perverse effect of providing a windfall to employ-
ers who, in the absence of their unlawful act and the ensuing litigation, would never
have discovered any after-acquired evidence." Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. See generally Kenneth G. Parker, After-Acquired Evidence in Employment
Discrimination Cases: A State of Disarray, 72 TEx. L REV. 403, 436-37 (1993) (rec-
ognizing this inconsistency in the Wallace court's reasoning and arguing that victims
of discrimination should be entitled to front pay and reinstatement until the date the
employer would have discovered the employee misconduct independent of the suit).
209. Id. at 1184. This evidence included Dunn's employee handbook, which details
Dunn's policy against drug use and falsification of records and authorized dismissal
for both. Id. Two of Neil's witnesses testified at depositions that they knew they
could be fired for lying on their job applications, and two of Neil's supervisors stated
in affidavits that Dunn would not have hired Neil and would have fired her had it
known of her drug record and job application fraud. Id. The court characterized this
controvert this evidence.1 0 Thus, the court granted partial summary
judgment on the issues of front pay, reinstatement and injunctive re-
lief.2' The court's determination of Neil's claim for backpay was simi-
larly easy to foretell. Because Dunn had not introduced evidence that it
would have discovered the after-acquired evidence by means independent
of and prior to Neil's lawsuit, the court denied Dunn's motion for sum-
mary judgment with respect to Neil's claim for backpay. 1 2
Judge Godbold dissented."' He took a novel position, arguing that
since Neil secured the job with Dunn under false pretenses, she was not
within the class protected by the civil rights law, and therefore she
lacked standing to sue.214 To support his view, Judge Godbold cited the
enforcement section of Title VII, which says, in part: "No order of the
court shall require... the hiring, reinstatement, or promotion of any
individual as an employee... if such individual was refused admission,
suspended, or expelled... for any reason other than [illegal] discrimina-
tion ... ." Thus, according to Judge Godbold, only "employees" are
protected by civil rights law, and Neil was not an "employee" within the
meaning of the statute.2'6 As an illustration, Judge Godbold suggested
that Congress did not intend to offer civil rights protection to an "em-
ployee" whose name a collaborator had fraudulently placed on the pay-
roll and who received paychecks without ever having worked.17 Judge
Godbold believed that Neil was not materially different from this "absen-
tee" employee."8
Judge Godbold's standing argument, although seductive, falters under
scrutiny. The civil rights law protects "employees" from discrimination.
The question is whether a person who secured a job under false pretens-
es is an "employee." Judge Godbold says "no" simply because he believes
the civil rights law should not protect such a person."' He can point to
nothing in the civil rights law that will substantiate this view."s Further-
evidence as "unrelenting," and therefore granted summary judgment. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 1184-85.
212. Id. at 1184.
213. Id. at 1185 (Godbold, J., dissenting).
214. Id. (Godbold, J., dissenting).
215. Id. at 1188 (Godbold, J., dissenting) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(A) (1981))
(emphasis added by Judge Godbold).
216. Id. (Godbold, J., dissenting).
217. Id. (Godbold, J., dissenting).
218. Id. (Godbold, J., dissenting).
219. Id.
220. See id. See generally Parker, supra note 208, at 429 (refuting standing argu-
ment on the ground that it is inconsistent with Title VI's definition of "employee").
However, one commentator approves of the argument and would expand It. He be-
lieves that employee misconduct in the course of employment, if grounds for termina-
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more, characterization of Neil as a "non-employee" would find little sup-
port in other quarters." If Dunn had failed to deduct payroll taxes from
Neil's paycheck, it is doubtful that the IRS would have excused Dunn's
neglect on the grounds that Neil was not an "employee." If Neil had been
injured on the job, no one would have argued that she would not have
been eligible for Workers' Compensation. If Dunn had laid her off, she
surely would have been eligible for unemployment insurance. Neil
worked as a flagperson on Dunn's payroll. She, doubtless, regarded her-
self as Dunn's employee, and Dunn regarded itself as her employer. It is
sophistry to characterize their relationship as anything else.
B. The Second Assault on Summers: Mardell v. Harleyville
In Mardell v. Harleyville Life Insurance Co., the Third Circuit rejected
Summers. Harleyville hired Nancy Mardell, a fifty year-old woman, to
manage insurance agents. 2 Two years later, Harleyville fired her pur-
portedly for poor job performance.' She filed suit alleging age and sex
discrimination. 4 Pre-trial disclosure revealed that Mardell, in applying
for the job, had materially misrepresented her education and employment
history.
Based on this after-acquired evidence of resume fraud, Harleyville
moved for summary judgment.' Harleyville attached to the motion the
affidavits of Mardelrs supervisor and the executive who had hired
her. 8 These submissions sought to prove that Mardell would not have
tion, deprives the employee of standing under civil rights law. See Muth, supra note
52, at 346.
221. For example, in the context of Workers' Compensation Law, Professor Larsen
has said: "[I]t has been held that employment which has been obtained by the mak-
ing of false statements--even criminally false statements--whether by a minor or an
adult, is still employment; that is the technical illegality will not of itself destroy
compensation coverage." ARTHUR LARSEN, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
§ 47.53 (1990 & Supp. 1993) (citations omitted). For a discussion of the status of the
after-acquired evidence doctrine in Workers' Compensation Law, see supra note 6.
222. 31 F.3d 1221, 1222 (3d Cir. 1994).
223. Id. at 1222-23. Mardell commenced her employment in February 1988 and was
fired in December 1989. Id.
224. Id. at 1223. Four months after Mardell was fired, Harleyville hired a 40 year
old male to replace her. Id.
225. Id. at 1224.
226. Id. Mardell was hired by Glyn Mangum, the vice-president of sales, and super-
vised by William Forloine, Harleyville's senior vice-president of marketing and sales.
Id.
been hired if the company had been aware of her actual background and
that she would have been fired as soon as her dishonesty had been dis-
covered. 7
The court disallowed the after-acquired evidence at the liability stage
of a civil rights suit;' however, it held such evidence relevant for de-
termining what remedy was appropriate.' To reach this conclusion, the
court agreed with Wallace that, because Price Waterhouse dealt with
what actually motivated the discharge, the Price Waterhouse mixed-mo-
tives analysis' is inapplicable to after-acquired evidence cases."
Wary of permitting after-acquired evidence to put an employee in a posi-
tion worse than he would have occupied absent illegal discrimination,'
the court in MardeU concluded that "the sole question to be answered at
[the liability] stage is whether the employer discriminated against the
employee on the basis of an impermissible factor...."'
The court proceeded to criticize arguments supporting the Summers
positiontm by rejecting the contention that resume fraud deprives a
worker of employee status under Title VII or the ADEA.' The court
asserted that since establishing a prima facie case of disparate treatment
requires proof of discriminatory intent, 0 the employment status of the
worker is irrelevant. 7 This argument is specious. The plaintiffs status
as an employee is not rendered irrelevant merely because intent is an
element of a discrimination claim. The court next argued, again uncon-
vincingly, that Title VII and the ADEA protect any "individual," rather
than only "employees."' This argument ignores the essence of laws in-
tended to combat employment discrimination and protect "any individu-
227. Id.
228. Id. at 1228-30.
229. Id. at 1238-40.
230. The filing of MardeU preceded the effective date of the 1991 amendments to
Title VII.
231. MardeU, 31 F.3d at 1229-30.
232. Id. at 1237-38. For a discussion of this argument see supra notes 192-95 and
accompanying text.
233. MardeU, 31 F.3d at 1228.
234. The court reiterated the property rights argument first articulated in Washing-
ton v. Lake County, Ill., 969 F.2d 250, 256 (7th Cir. 1992) and expanded the argument
to encompass any application of Summers, whether based on the "would not have
hired" test or "would have fired" test. MardeU, 31 F.3d at 1233. For a discussion of
this argument see supra note 122 and accompanying text.
235. MardeU, 31 F.3d at 1230-31.
236. Id. at 1224-25 (citing Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S.
248, 253-54, 256 (1981); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
237. MardeU, 31 F.3d at 1230-31.
238. Id. at 1231. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a) (1981) (providing the text of the stat-
ute referred to); 29 U.S.C.A. § 623(9) (1985) (stating the statute discussed in full).
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al" as an employee.' Finally articulating a persuasive argument, the
court recognized that even if the civil rights laws are interpreted to re-
strict coverage to "employees,"' as they undoubtedly should be, noth-
ing in the statutes suggests that resume fraud deprives a worker of em-
ployee status."'
Criticizing the Summers "no-injury" argument, the court observed that
"[a] victim of discrimination suffers a dehumanizing injury,"" which
causes "a demoralizing impairment of his or her self-esteem."' The
court's observation, though perhaps justifying relief for non-economic
injury, does not support a claim for backpay as the court suggests. The
court might have recognized that a victim of discriminatory discharge,
even when guilty of resume fraud or other misconduct, endures not only
humiliation, but also a distinct, compensable injury-the loss of employ-
ment.'
The court then turned to the federal policy that seeks to deter civil
rights violations. It stated that a plaintiff alleging employment discrimina-
tion acts "as a 'private attorney general' to enforce the paramount public
interest in eradicating invidious discrimination."' "Deterrence is ac-
complished by placing an economic price on discriminatory acts, and by
exposing and stigmatizing the wrongdoer's acts before the entire commu-
nity."' To promote these policies, the court held after-acquired evi-
dence inadmissible at the liability stage.4 7 However, the court acknowl-
edged the relevance of such evidence in fashioning the remedy and ech-
oed the Wallace "hypothetical date of discovery test"' which, as noted,
239. Mardell, 31 F.3d at 1231.
240. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(f) (1981) (providing a definition); 29 U.S.C.A. § 630(f)
(1985).
241. MardeU, 31 F.3d at 1231. See supra notes 213-21 and accompanying text for
discussion of the standing argument.
242. MardeU, 31 F.3d at 1232.
243. Id. at 1233. See generaUy Yoo, supra note 130, at 253-54 (arguing that victims
of discrimination should be compensated for non-economic injury, particularly under
the 1991 Civil Rights Act, which provides for "compensatory and punitive damages"
for "emotional pain, suffering . . . and other non-pecuniary losses." 42 U.S.C § 1981a,
a(b)(3) (Supp. M 1991)).
244. See infra notes 250-65 and accompanying text.
245. MardeU, 31 F.3d at 1234.
246. Id. at 1235.
247. Id. at 1234-37. See supra note 172 and accompanying text. See generaUy Yoo,
supra note 130, at 148-49.
248. Mardell, 31 F.3d at 123940.
provides an unsatisfactory alternative to Summers.49
VI. A REASONABLE ALTERNATIVE: TERMINATING
BACK-PAY WHEN THE AFER-ACQUIRED EVIDENCE IS DISCOVERED
Both the majority position, espoused in Summers, and the minority
view, articulated in Wallace, are misguided. The Summers position forces
a defense, appropriate in contract law, into the wholly inappropriate are-
na of civil rights law. Based on after-acquired evidence, Summers errone-
ously denies that a victim of discrimination has been injured.m
The Summers position invites employers to fabricate after-the-fact
justifications to extricate themselves from discrimination lawsuits."
The temptation may be irresistible. Presented with tailored, self-serving
submissions, most courts deny the plaintiff a day in court, granting sum-
mary judgment with mechanical regularity to employers.s This problem
will become more acute if the trend to follow Summers continues.'n
Although recognizing that victims of discrimination are injured regard-
less of after-acquired evidence of misconduct, Wallace is equally unac-
ceptable. Only in rare circumstances will an employer be able to prove
that on a certain date it would have learned of employee misconduct, if
it had not learned of the misconduct as the result of the discrimination
lawsuit. Although such a burden might be met in a refusal to hire case
where the employer follows procedures to investigate the information
the employee has entered on his job application,s the burden will be
nearly insurmountable in the far more prevalent wrongful discharge suit,
where such procedures are not followed. If the employer fails to meet
249. See supra notes 206-08, 254-55 and accompanying text
250. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
251. See, e.g., Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co., 968 F.2d 1174 (11th Cir. 1992), reh'g
granted, No. 91-7406, 1994 WL 481439 (Sept. 6, 1994). The Wallace court noted:
The Summers rule does not encourage employers to eliminate discrimination.
Rather, it invites them to establish ludicrously low thresholds for 'legitimate'
termination and to devote fewer resources to preventing discrimination be-
cause Summers gives them the option to escape all liability by rummaging
through an unlawfully-discharged employee's background for flaws and then
manufacturing a 'legitimate' reason for the discharge that fits the flaws in the
employee's background.
Id.; see supra notes 196-200 and accompanying text.
252. See supra notes 9-14 and accompanying text.
253. Id.
254. Smallwood v. United Air Lines, Inc., may be such a case since there, United,
which denied Smallwood a job as a pilot, might have learned of his disqualifying be-
havior at ONA by pursuing the process it customarily used when evaluating prospec-
tive employees. Smallwood v. United Airlines, Inc., 728 F.2d 614 (4th Cir. 1984); see
also Turnes v. AmSouth Bank, NA, 36 F.3d 1057 (11th Cir. 1994).
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the burden, the employee will receive backpay until the date the court fi-
nally disposes of the case.' This artificial cutoff, which may take years
to reach, provides the employee with a windfall.
The issue is how to measure a discrimination victim's damages when
the employee would have been discharged legitimately if the employer
had known of after-acquired evidence of misconduct. One should not ig-
nore such after-acquired evidence. As nearly all courts agree, it would be
absurd to order the reinstatement of an employee guilty of misconduct
justifying his dismissal.' Yet depriving such an employee of backpay
fails to provide adequate compensation. The aggrieved employee should
be entitled to backpay from the date of discharge until the date the em-
ployer actually discovers the legitimate reason for dismissal. 7 The date
of discovery marks when the employer legitimately could and presum-
ably would have fired the employee. Such damages compensate the em-
ployee for his actual injury.
This measure of damages is also practical. Using the date of discovery
circumvents the need to engage in the fanciful conjecture Wallace re-
quires, without tacitly encouraging illegal discrimination and the exagger-
ation, if not contrivance, of after-the-fact justifications for dismissal.'
Public policy, as expressed in state and federal civil rights law, seeks
to rid the workplace of discrimination. Achieving this goal is a matter of
national concern. At the same time the law condemns activities such as
resume fraud, falsifying work documents and removing company records
without permission. Dismissal is the price of employee misconduct.
These interests conflict when an employer uses after-acquired evidence
to defend against the charge of discrimination. The date of discovery test
sensibly balances these interests. On the one hand, victims of discrimina-
tion receive redress. Offenders are exposed publicly and must compen-
sate victims for substantial periods of backpay. Future violations of civil
rights law are thus deterred and the public policy to eradicate invidious
discrimination is promoted. Yet the victim, who is also a wrongdoer,
does not escape without penalty. His right to recover damages ends
when the employer discovers the misconduct. Neither the employer nor
the employee benefits from a windfall. Both reap the consequences of
their wrongdoing.'
255. See Wallace, 968 F.2d at 1182.
256. But see McPartland v. American Broadcasting Co., 623 F. Supp. 1334, 1344
(S.D.N.Y. 1985).
257. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
258. See supra notes 196-200, 254-55 and accompanying text.
259. See James G. Babb, The Use of After-Acquired Evidence As a Defense In Title
Critics of the "date of discovery" rule complain that the employer
should not benefit from his wrongdoing. If he had not unlawfully dis-
criminated against the employee, he would not have discovered the
employee's misconduct.' They also argue that this rule fails to com-
pensate adequately victims of discrimination." These arguments fail to
recognize that, irrespective of how the employer learned of the
employee's misconduct, the employer would have had the right to fire
him immediately. No provision of the civil rights law deprives an employ-
er of this right. Furthermore, critics focus unduly on punishing the em-
ployer, while overlooking the employee's wrongdoing.
Another objection to the "date of discovery" rule is that the rule, like
the Summers approach, provides incentive for employers to concoct
after-the fact justifications for firing employees who have filed civil rights
actions.' This criticism can be raised against any rule that permits the
use of after-acquired evidence-even the Wallace approach. However, the
force of the criticism is mitigated to the extent that an approach assures
the victim a remedy of backpay. Unlike the Summers formulation, the
"date of discovery" rule assures the victim such a remedy.
In a disparate treatment case, when the employer purports to have
fired the employee for a legitimate reason, the employee will ordinarily
offer proof that the purported justification is a pretext.' An aggrieved
employee may similarly expose as a pretext his employer's after-acquired
evidence defense. While the Summers line of cases has denied employ-
ees this opportunity, granting employers summary judgment with ruthless
facility,'s the courts should adopt the skeptical approach of Welch v.
Liberty Machine Works, Inc.' and let the trier of fact decide if an
avowed legitimate reason is really a self-serving fantasy.
VII Employment Discrimination Cases, 30 Hous. L REv. 1945, 1972 (1994).
260. See, e.g., Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co., 968 F.2d 1174, 1182 (lth Cir. 1992),
reh'g granted, No. 91-7406, 1994 WL 481439 (Sept 6, 1994).
We realize that an alternative approach exists-to end the period of backpay
on the day that Dunn actually learned of the after-acquired evidence in the
course of litigating this case .... [This] alternative approach would have the
perverse effect of providing a windfall to employers who, in the absence of
their unlawful act and the ensuing litigation, would never have discovered
any after-acquired evidence.
Id. at 1182.
261. See generally Zemelman, supra note 176, at 205-06 (arguing that the "date of
discovery" rule fails to provide make-whole relief).
262. See generally id. (asserting that the date of discovery rule encourages employ-
er fishing expeditions into employees' backgrounds).
263. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.- 792 (1993).
264. See supra notes 9-14 and accompanying text.
265. 23 F.3d 1403, 1405 (8th Cir. 1994).
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VII. CONCLUSION
The after-acquired evidence doctrine of Summers is alluring. If an
employee, through his fraud or misconduct, has forfeited his right to a
job, the employer should have no obligations to him. Thus, civil rights
law should not protect the employee. Because the principle is simple, the
conclusion seems inescapable. Nevertheless, the conclusion is wrong.
Violating civil rights law inflicts injury apart from the loss caused by a
mere breach of contract. After-acquired evidence of employee defalca-
tions, although a defense to contract actions, should not be a defense to
civil rights claims.
Yet, it is not sensible to require an employer to prove when and how it
would have discovered such after-acquired evidence independent of the
civil rights action. The Wallace standard imposes an unrealistic burden
on employers.
The most practical approach, which accommodates the interests of
employer, employee and society, is the "date of discovery" formulation.
By adopting this rule, the courts will abandon confusion and replace it
with common sense and equity.
ADDENDUM
Shortly before publication of this Article, The United States Supreme
Court decided McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co.' The
McKennon Court unanimously rejected both the Summers and Wallace
positions and adopted the date-of-discovery rule advocated in this Arti-
cle.2
In McKennon, the Nashville Banner fired McKennon, an employee of
thirty years, ostensibly as part of a plan to reduce its work force.
McKennon, who was sixty-two when fired, sued for age discrimination
under the ADEA. During her deposition, McKennon admitted that she
had surreptitiously copied confidential company documents disclosing its
financial condition, took the copies home, and showed them to her hus-
band. She explained that she was seeking "insurance" against the dis-
criminatory discharge which she anticipated. Based on this after-acquired
evidence of misconduct, the Banner moved for summary judgment. Rely-
ing on Summers and Johnson v. Honeywell Information Systems, Inc.,3
the District Court granted the motion and the Sixth Circuit affirmed.4
The Supreme Court, in a cryptic opinion, reversed and remanded the
case.5 Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy emphasized the dual policy
of the ADEA and Title VII: to deter illegal discrimination and to compen-
sate victims.' When victims of discrimination bring suit, they promote
these goals.7 To deny their claims based on after-acquired evidence
would frustrate the objectives of federal civil rights law.' Noting that
Summers relied substantially on Mt. Healthy City School District Board
of Education v. Doyle,' Justice Kennedy found the mixed-motives analy-
sis of Mt. Healthy irrelevant" because in an after-acquired evidence
case, unlike a mixed motives case, the legitimate motive played no part
in the decision to fire." After-acquired evidence does not bear on and
thus cannot negate discriminatory intent.2 It is, therefore, not a bar to a
1. No. 93-1543, 1995 LEXIS U.S. 699 (Jan. 23, 1995).
2. Id. at *19-20.
3. 955 F.2d 409 (6th Cir. 1992).
4. McKennon, No. 93-1543, 1995 LEXIS 699, at *6 (Jan. 23, 1995).
5. Id. at *21.
6. Id. at *12.
7. Id.
8. Id. at *12-13.
9. Id. at *14 (citing Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle,
429 U.S. 274 (1977).
10. Id. at *15. The Court qualified this assertion, stating that Mt. Healthy is rel-
evant to the extent that it reinforces the necessity of proving the employer's motive
in discharging the employee.
11. Id. at *15 (Jan. 23, 1995).
12. Id.
[Vol. 22: 365, 1995] After-Acquired Evidence
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
discrimination claim."
Though holding that after-acquired evidence is not a complete defense
to a civil rights claim, the Court acknowledged that such evidence should
be considered in determining the remedy.'4 The misconduct of the em-
ployee must be taken into account, because the proper role of such evi-
dence depends not only on the policies of federal civil rights law but also
on the employer's legitimate interests, which include the prerogatives to
hire, promote and fire employees.'" After holding that, as a general rule,
neither front pay nor reinstatement is an appropriate remedy,'6 the
Court ruled that an employee is entitled to backpay from the date of
discharge until the actual date of discovery of the after-acquired evi-
dence.'"
Once an employer learns about employee wrongdoing that would lead to a legiti-
mate discharge, we cannot require the employer to ignore the information, even if
it is acquired during the course of discovery in a suit against the employer and
even if the information might have gone undiscovered absent the suit. The begin-
ning point of the trial court's formulation of a remedy should be calculation of
backpay from the date of the unlawful discharge to the date the new information
was discovered.'8
The High Court suggested that, if presented "extraordinary equitable cir-
cumstances," lower courts might diverge from this formulation.'9 How-
ever, the Court failed to provide guidance of what such circumstances
might be.
To answer charges that employers might gain undue advantage by
using after-acquired evidence, the Court stressed that an employer may
use such evidence only if the employer establishes that it would have
fired the employee based on the evidence.' The Court discounted fears
of employer fishing expeditions to unearth employee misconduct, com-
menting that assessment of attorneys fees and imposition of Rule 11
13. Id. The Court held the unclean hands defense inappropriate to foreclose plain-
tiffs relief, relying on Perma Life Mufflers Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S.
134, 138 (1968), an anti-trust case, which rejected the defense because of the impor-
tance of federal anti-trust policy. The McKennon Court ruled that federal civil rights
law embodies a national policy of analogous significance. Id. at *16 (Jan. 23, 1995).
14. Id. at *16 (Jan. 23, 1995).
15. Id, at *17.
16. Id.
17. Id. at *19-20.
18. Id.
19. Id. at *20.
20. Id.
sanctions will deter most abuses.21
In adopting the date-of-discovery rule, the Court correctly balanced the
conflicting interests presented in the case. However, the Court might
have elaborated on its rationale. Furthermore, some of its reasoning is
suspect. If after-acquired evidence is admissible on the issue of backpay,
it is hard to understand why searching for such evidence justifies sanc-
tions. The date-of-discovery rule mitigates concerns over fishing expedi-
tionsi because that rule precludes summary judgment for the employer
and assures the employee a substantial award of backpay. A more press-
ing concern arises when an employer uses after-acquired evidence as a
pretext; a dishonest employer might lie that it would have fired the em-
ployee based on such evidence. Courts may punish such duplicity with
sanctions. Ultimately, however, the answer rests with the trier of fact. In
disparate treatment cases the trier of fact must evaluate the evidence to
determine if the purportedly legitimate reason for firing the employee is
a pretext for discrimination.' The same responsibility falls to the trier
of fact when the employer interposes an after-acquired evidence defense.
21. Id. at "20-21.
22. St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2747-48 (1993); Texas Dept.
of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255-56 (1981); McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 793, 804 (1973).
